Trial by Numbers by Helm, Rebecca K. et al.
Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy
Volume 27
Issue 1 Fall 2017 Article 3
Trial by Numbers
Rebecca K. Helm
University of Exeter
Valerie P. Hans
Cornell Law School, valerie.hans@cornell.edu
Valerie F. Reyna
Cornell University, vr53@cornell.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Evidence Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Helm, Rebecca K.; Hans, Valerie P.; and Reyna, Valerie F. (2017) "Trial by Numbers," Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy: Vol. 27 :
Iss. 1 , Article 3.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp/vol27/iss1/3
TRIAL BY NUMBERS
Rebecca K. Helm, Valerie P. Hans & Valerie F. Reyna*
Legal cases often require jurors to use numerical information. They
may need to evaluate the meaning of specific numbers, such as the
probability of match between a suspect and a DNA sample, or they may
need to arrive at a sound numerical judgment, such as a money damage
award. Thus, it is important to know how jurors understand numerical
information, and what steps can be taken to increase juror comprehen-
sion and appropriate application of numerical evidence. In this Article,
we examine two types of juror decisions involving numbers--decisions
in which jurors must convert numbers into meaning (such as by under-
standing numerical evidence in order to determine guilt or liability), and
decisions in which jurors must convert meaning into numbers (such as by
understanding qualitative evidence and converting this into a numerical
damage award amount). In each of these areas we analyze legal cases
and research to examine areas in which dealing with numbers leads to
sound or sub-optimal decision making in jurors. We then examine psy-
chological theory and research on numerical decision making to under-
stand how informed, fair, and consistent juror decision making about
numbers can be promoted. We conclude that what is often most impor-
tant is juror understanding of the meaning of numbers in context rather
than technically precise numerical ability, supporting the role of the lay
jury. We also suggest how to improve juror understanding, so that jury
decisions better reflect considered community judgment.
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INTRODUCTION
Jurors are generally sound decision makers in both civil and crimi-
nal trials. Findings from empirical studies show that the strength of evi-
dence presented at trial is a major determinant of jury verdicts, and that
civil jury damage awards are strongly correlated with the degree of in-
jury in a case.' However, despite the overall strengths of juries, some
cases place significant demands on citizen jurors. These cases include
those in which jurors are required to engage in numerical decision mak-
ing, either through considering numerical evidence or through being
asked to reach a numerical decision such as a percentage of liability or a
damage award amount. The information presented to jurors in these
cases is becoming increasingly complex as new scientific techniques and
technological innovations develop and as their presentation in the na-
tion's courtrooms becomes more detailed and complicated.2 Litigators
I Shari Seidman Diamond, Beyond Fantasy and Nightmare: A Portrait of the Jury, 54
BUFF. L. REv. 717 (2006); Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, The Verdict on Juries, 91 JUDICA-
TURE 226, 226 (2007); HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966);
Richard 0. Lempert, The American Jury System: A Synthetic Overview, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
825 (2015); SUJA THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN JURY: RESTORING THE FUNDAMENTAL
CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF CRIMINAL, CIVIL, AND GRAND JURIES (2016); NEIL VIDMAR & VA-
LERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT (2007).
2 See Sanjeev Bajwa, Apple v. Samsung: Is it Time to Change our Patent Trial System?
27 GLOBAL Bus. & DEv. L.J. 77 (2014); EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRESIDENT'S
COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: FORENSIC
SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON
METHODS (Sept. 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/
ostplPCAST/pcast forensicscience-report final.pdf.
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are increasingly presenting detailed numerical information to jurors,
moving away from the previous practice of offering simple conclusory
statements by experts.3
The complexity of numbers that jurors must now understand and
use is illustrated by the recent patent litigation involving two high-tech
giants, Apple and Samsung. In this case, a civil jury was asked to deter-
mine whether Samsung had infringed on numerous Apple patents, and if
so, the sum of damages that Samsung should pay Apple for this infringe-
ment.4 Jurors were required to delve deeply into complex financial doc-
uments and expert opinions to determine if patents were infringed, and if
so, what they should be worth. This included determining the precise
profits for twenty-eight devices and determining the percentage of profits
owed for the infringement. 5 This task was further complicated by the fact
that numbers varied greatly depending on whether they were generated
by Apple's or Samsung's experts.6 This was clearly a complex task, as
the jury tackled a twenty-page verdict form requiring hundreds of judg-
ments.7 Following the trial, the judge ruled that some damages needed to
be recalculated due to jury error.8
Concerns about the jury's ability to understand, critically evaluate,
and apply complex evidence, including numerical evidence, have led to
arguments that "blue-ribbon" juries should be used in some cases.9 Blue-
ribbon juries are juries selected for their special qualities such as ad-
vanced education or special training.' 0 Such juries are controversial since
they are drawn from unrepresentative samples of the population.I' In ad-
3 William C. Thompson & Eryn J. Newman, Lay Understanding of Forensic Statistics:
Evaluation of Random Match Probabilities, Likelihood Ratios, and Verbal Equivalents, 39
LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 332, 332 (2015).
4 William F. Lee, WilmerHale, Presentation to Cornell Law School, The Smartphone
Wars: The Apple-Samsung Trial (Feb. 20, 2017); Greg Sandoval, How Qualified is the Apple-
Samsung Jury? We Found Out, CNET (Aug. 24, 2012, 2:52 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-
13579_3-57499944-37/how-qualified-is-the-apple-samsung-jury-we-found-out.
5 Nilay Patel, Apple vs. Samsung: Inside a Jury's Nightmare, THE VERGE (Aug. 23,
2012, 10:31 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2012/8/23/3260463/apple-samsung-jury-verdict-
form-nightmare.
6 Id.
7 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Ltd., Samsung Electronics America Inc., Samsung
Telecommunications America, LLC., No. 1 I-CV-01846-LHK, verdict form (N.D. Cal. August
21 2012), http://assets.sbnation.com/assets/1307288/1890_finalverdictform.pdf.
8 Lee, supra note 4; Josh Lowensohn, Apple v. Samsung: Judge Orders New Trial on
Some Damages, Cuts Award by $450M, CNET (Mar. 1, 2013, 12:50 PM), https://
www.cnet.com/news/apple-v-samsung-judge-orders-new-trial-on-some-damages-cuts-award-
by-450m.
9 Jordan M. Halle, Avoiding Those Wearing Propeller Hats: The Use of Blue Ribbon
Juries in Complex Patent Litigation, 43 U. BALT. L. REV. 435, 436 (2014); JAMES OLDHAM,
TRIAL BY JURY: THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT AND ANGLo-AMERICAN SPECIAL JURIES (2006).
10 Id.
1 I See OLDHAM, supra note 9; VIDMAR & HANS, AMERICAN JURIES, supra note 1, at
66-69 (describing historical changes in opinions about special and blue-ribbon juries).
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dition, studies suggest that special juries of highly educated individuals
may not be a panacea for the challenges created by complex trials.12
Although such jurors may be better educated and better able to under-
stand numbers and perform mathematical calculations, they may still
lack understanding of nuances and the meaning of numbers in a particu-
lar type of case.' 3 Research has shown that even highly educated layper-
sons have a relatively poor understanding of probabilities, risks, and
other chance-related concepts.1 4 Blue-ribbon jurors are likely to be about
as susceptible as the rest of us to common cognitive errors and biases in
numerical decision making.15 To minimize errors when jurors deal with
numerical information, an understanding of how people process numeri-
cal information and how this can lead to cognitive errors and bias is
essential.
This Article begins by summarizing what we currently know about
how juries understand and use numbers in legal decision making, first in
the context of moving from numbers to a meaningful qualitative judg-
ment, and second in the context of translating a qualitative judgment into
a numerical decision. Then, it discusses theory-based research on numer-
ical cognition that can provide insight into how accurate and consistent
use of numbers can be facilitated. Finally, it draws on this theory-based
research to make suggestions for assistance that should be provided to
juries dealing with numbers in the trial setting. We analyze the positive
and negative effects of selecting juries with high levels of numeracy. We
conclude that numeracy is not a panacea in helping jurors when dealing
with numbers. In the majority of cases, what is most important is juror
understanding of the meaning of numbers rather than technical and pre-
cise numerical ability. Importantly, technical numerical ability is unlikely
to reduce many common juror errors and could potentially increase cer-
tain types of bias. This leads us to provide four new suggestions to help
jurors dealing with numbers: (1) targeted training; (2) use of visual aids;
(3) the provision of information to give context to numbers; and (4) ac-
tive jury trial reforms.
12 For discussion of studies showing problems encountered by highly educated and nu-
merate people, see Section IV.A infra.
13 Bajwa, supra note 2, at 90.
14 See Isaac M. Lipkis, Greg Samsa, & Barbara K. Rimer, General Performance on a
Numeracy Scale Among Highly Educated Samples, 21 MED. DECISION MAKING 37, 39-41
(2001).
15 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Can Judges Make
Reliable Numeric Judgments? Distorted Damages and Skewed Sentences, 90 IND. L.J. 695,
706-10 (2015) (showing that judges are influenced by anchoring effects); Valerie F. Reyna,
Wendy L. Nelson, Paul K. Han & Nathan F. Dieckmann, How Numeracy Influences Risk
Comprehension and Medical Decision Making, 135 PSYCHOL. BULL. 943, 946 (2009).
TRIAL BY NUMBERS
I. EXTRACTING MEANING FROM NUMBERS
Jurors are often asked to evaluate evidence involving probability
and statistics. One common moment is when a forensic scientist is at-
tempting to explain the strength of a piece of forensic evidence presented
at a jury trial.' 6 In the past, such evidence was presented in a categorical
fashion (e.g. two fingerprints were made by the same finger, they were
not made by the same finger, or the test was inconclusive).' 7 In 1997, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation announced that due to technological ad-
vances, "their experts would be permitted to testify that DNA from
blood, semen, or other biological evidence at a crime scene came from a
specific person.""' This practice was criticized as reducing the potential
donor pool to one source; the FBI claim was characterized as "not possi-
ble," and "not logically attainable."' 9 However, it could be reasonably
argued that reporting a source attribution within that donor pool when the
probability of another person having the same DNA profile in the rele-
vant population is nearly zero indeed uses the logic of probability to
make a claim that is very probably true (given the assumptions in the
analysis). The bottom line is that some forms of criminalistics evidence
are presented quantitatively, and we can expect increasing efforts to do
so with more identification methods being developed in the future, with
ensuing confusions and debates about probability judgments.
Recently, forensic scientists have been encouraged to characterize
the value of the evidence using statistics such as probabilities. 2 0 For ex-
ample, in the case of DNA evidence, when a suspect's DNA matches a
DNA sample from a crime scene, the probative value of that DNA evi-
dence may be conveyed by the probability of finding a match in someone
who is randomly sampled from a reference group, known as the random
match probability ("RMP"). 2 1 A low RMP means that the match between
a suspect and a recovered sample is unlikely to have occurred by chance;
instead, it is more likely that the defendant was truly the source of the
recovered sample. In contrast, a higher random match probability means
a match between a suspect and a recovered sample is more likely to be
coincidental, that is, to have occurred by chance. RMPs are frequently
16 Thompson & Newman, supra note 3.
17 Simon A. Cole, Individualization is Dead, Long Live Individualization! Reforms of
Reporting Practices for Fingerprint Analysis in the United States, 13 LAW, PROBABILITY &
RISK 117, 121-22 (2014).
18 Constance Holden, DNA Fingerprinting Comes of Age, 278 SCIENCE 1407, 1407
(1997).
19 Cole, supra note 17, at 122.
20 Thompson & Newman, supra note 3; Mike Redmayne, Paul Roberts, Colin Aitken &
Graham Jackson, Forensic Science Evidence in Question, 5 CRIM. L. REv. 347, 355-56
(2011).
21 Cole, supra note 17, at 132-33.
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used by the prosecution in this way in cases to convey the significance of
a match. 22
Providing jurors with such statistics may allow them to appropri-
ately weigh evidence. Research suggests that jurors are often influenced
appropriately and as intended by statistical information. 23 For example,
research on RMPs shows that juror evaluations of evidence do vary ap-
propriately when the RMP is varied (more weight is given to the evi-
dence when the RMP is lower and less weight is given to the evidence
when the RMP is higher). 24 However, jurors do face challenges when
dealing with numbers in this context. Psychological theory and existing
research suggest that jurors are at risk of being subject to cognitive errors
and inconsistencies when interpreting statistical evidence, that jurors
may frequently be unable to critique complex statistics given by experts
effectively, and that jurors' existing viewpoints may influence their inter-
pretations of statistical evidence. 25
A. Interpreting Statistical Evidence
Evidence suggests that the way in which numerical evidence is
framed and presented can influence how jurors think about the evidence
and how probative they consider it to be. 2 6 This means that jurors may be
convinced that the same statistical evidence is impressive or insuffi-
cient. 27 Like the rest of us, jurors are susceptible to specific cognitive
biases when evaluating statistical evidence, which can result in inconsis-
tent interpretations of identical evidence and errors in interpreting statis-
tical evidence. 28
In the context of DNA RMPs, Jonathan Koehler has identified two
ways that changing the presentation of statistics can change juror inter-
22 See United States v. Shea, 957 F. Supp. 331, 345-46 (D.N.H. 1997); People v. Xiong,
215 Cal. App. 4th 1259, 1269-70 (2013); United States v. Morrow, 374 F. Supp. 2d 51, 54
(D.D.C. 2005).
23 David L. Faigman & A. J. Baglioni Jr., Bayes' Theorem in the Trial Process: In-
structing Jurors on the Value of Statistical Evidence, 12 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 1, 16 (1988);
Brian C. Smith, Steven D. Penrod, Amy L. Otto & Roger C. Park, Jurors' Use of Probabilistic
Evidence, 20 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 49, 78 (1996); William C. Thompson, Suzanne 0. Kaasa
& Tiamoyo Peterson, Do Jurors Give Appropriate Weight to Forensic Identification Evi-
dence?, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 359, 359 (2013).
24 Id.
25 Cf .Dan M. Kahan, Ellen Peters, Maggie Wittlin, Paul Slovic, Lisa Larrimore Ouel-
lette, Donald Braman & Gregory Mandel, The Polarizing Impact of Science Literacy and
Numeracy on Perceived Climate Change Risks, 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 732, 732-33
(2012).
26 Jonathan J. Koehler, The Psychology of Numbers in the Courtroom: How to Make
DNA-Match Statistics Seem Impressive or Insufficient, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1275, 1277 (2001).
27 Id. at 1282-84.
28 COLIN AITKEN & FRANCO TARONI, STATISTICS AND THE EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE
FOR FORENSIC SCIENTISTS 81-82 (2004) (describing some common errors).
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pretation of evidence--through changing the target of the statistics and
through changing the frame. 29 When considering RMPs, the "target" of
the DNA match can either be the suspect or a larger reference
population. 3 0
Imagine a case in which a DNA match has been found between a
suspect and material recovered from a crime scene. Consider the follow-
ing two pieces of evidence:
a) The chance that the suspect would match the DNA if
he were not the source is I in 1,000.
b) The DNA of I in every 1,000 people in the city in
which the crime occurred would match the DNA.
When the target is the subject, as in (a), it seems less likely that a
match occurred by chance, but when a larger reference population is the
subject, as in (b), it seems more likely that a match occurred by chance.
Although these pieces of evidence are equivalent, Koehler has shown
that jurors are likely to perceive DNA evidence as less incriminating
when the RMP is presented as it is in (b).31 Jurors who are encouraged to
think about a larger reference group (e.g. people in the city in which the
crime occurred), rather than the suspect, are likely to be less persuaded
by DNA evidence suggesting that the suspect is guilty. 3 2 This, in turn,
influences judgments of guilt. 3 3  -
The way that information is framed, in particular whether the evi-
dence is framed as a frequency or a probability, has also been shown to
influence how people think about statistical evidence. 34 Jurors are more
likely to be convinced by DNA evidence when RMPs are presented as
probabilities (e.g. a .001 chance of a random match) rather than frequen-
cies (e.g. a 1 in 1,000 chance of a random match).35 This finding is also
true for numbers more generally--people tend to overestimate frequen-
cies compared to probabilities. 36
Research has examined approaches other than RMPs to convey the
importance of a DNA match.3 7 One study using mock juror participants
compared three ways of reporting the reliability of evidence indicating a
match between the defendant and evidence from a crime scene (focusing
29 Koehler, supra note 26.
30 Id.
31 Jonathan J. Koehler, When Are People Persuaded by DNA Match Statistics? 25 LAW
& Hum. BEHAV. 493, 497-98 (2001).
32 Id.
33 Id. at 502.
34 Id. at 497
35 Id. at 502
36 Valerie P. Hans & Valerie F. Reyna, To Dollars from Sense: Qualitative to Quantita-
tive Translation in Jury Damage Awards, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 120, 124 (2011).
37 See Thompson & Newman, supra note 3.
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on DNA evidence and shoeprint evidence)--using RMPs, likelihood ra-
tios, and verbal equivalents.38 Using likelihood ratios involves consider-
ing two mutually exclusive hypotheses--Hi: that the items have the
same source, and H2: that the items do not have the same source. 39 The
likelihood of the observed results occurring under each of the two hy-
potheses is then calculated and the ratio of these two likelihoods is re-
ported. 40 This can result in the conclusion that the probability of
obtaining this evidence if the items have the same source is x times
higher than obtaining this evidence if the items do not have the same
source. 4 1 So, the ratio gives the likelihood of a DNA match if the defen-
dant was the true source of the DNA evidence, compared to the likeli-
hood of a DNA match if the defendant was not the true source of the
DNA evidence. A likelihood ratio greater than one means it is more
likely that the defendant was the true source of the DNA evidence, while
a likelihood ratio of less than one means it is more likely that the defen-
dant was not the true source. (Note that a likelihood ratio greater than
one provides no assurance that the probability that the defendant was the
true source is greater than .50). Using verbal equivalents involves com-
puting a likelihood ratio and then reporting the results in words rather
than numbers, according to a graduated scale.42
A 2013 study found that, as predicted, participants were influenced
by the way in which the forensic evidence was presented; RMP state-
ments helped jurors to distinguish best between strong and moderate fo-
rensic evidence. 4 3 For example, participants viewing very strong
shoeprint evidence were more influenced by that evidence when shown
RMPs than when shown likelihood ratios or verbal equivalents. 44 Partici-
pants viewing shoeprint evidence were only sensitive to the strength of
the evidence (very strong or moderate) when shown RMPs, and not when
shown likelihood ratios or verbal equivalents. 45
In addition to inconsistencies when interpreting evidence, mock ju-
rors have been shown to make cognitive errors. One example is the
source probability error. This is the tendency to equate the chance that a
suspect would match a DNA trace if he was not the source with the
38 Thompson & Newman, supra note 3.
39 Id. at 333.
40 Id.
41 Id.; Geoffrey Stewart Morrison, Measuring the Validity and Reliability of Forensic
Likelihood-Ratio Systems, 51 SC. & JUST. 91, 97-98 (2011).
42 Kristy A. Martire, Richard I. Kemp, Ian Watkins, Malindi A. Sayle & Ben R. Newell,
The Expression and Interpretation of Uncertain Forensic Science Evidence: Verbal Equiva-
lence, Evidence Strength, and the Weak Evidence Effect, 37 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 197, 197
(2013).
43 Id. at 203-04.
44 Id. at 205.
45 Id.
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probability that the suspect is not the source of the trace. 4 6 For example,
one might assume that:
a) The chance that the suspect would match the DNA if
he were not the source is 1 in 1,000, means that;
b) The chance that the suspect is not the source of the
trace is 1 in 1,000.
These seem on the surface to be similar, but some careful reflection
will show why they are not equivalent. Although the DNA evidence can
include the defendant in a relatively small group of potential sources, it
cannot distinguish the defendant from other individuals in that group and
so cannot indicate the probability that the defendant, and not another
group member, is the source. 4 7 Although this is incorrect, people mistak-
enly infer the probability that matching items have (or do not have) a
common source from the RMP. If the chance that the suspect would
match the DNA was 1 in 1,000 (as in the example above), there would be
around 320,000 people in the USA who would be a match (as the popula-
tion of the USA is approximately 320 million), so the DNA alone cannot
indicate the probability that the defendant was the source of the DNA.
A similar cognitive error, known as the prosecutor's fallacy, occurs
when people equate the RMP with the probability that a defendant is
innocent given a match.4 8 This is statistically incorrect because it equates
the probability of being innocent given a match with the probability of a
match given innocence (two different values). In addition to being statis-
tically incorrect, there are other sources of potential error too. The report
of a match could be the result of a false positive lab error or the planting
of incriminating evidence by the police. Defendants have raised the pos-
sibility of jurors committing the prosecutor's fallacy to argue against the
admissibility of random match probability statistics, but this argument is
often not successful.4 9
Evidence also suggests that jurors may have difficulty combining
two different reasons why DNA evidence may not be conclusive, for
example, the chance that a DNA match was coincidental and the chance
that the DNA match was due to a laboratory error.5 0 A study by Jason
Schklar and Shari Seidman Diamond found that the majority of mock
jurors used an improper method to combine such probabilities (such as
46 Jonathan J. Koehler, Error and Exaggeration in the Presentation of DNA Evidence at
Trial, 34 JURIMETRlCS J. 21, 27 (1993).
47 Thompson & Newman, supra note 3, at 335.
48 Thompson et al., supra note 23, at 362.
49 See United States v. Shea, 957 F. Supp. 331, 345-46 (D.N.H. 1997).
50 Jason Schklar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juror Reactions to DNA Evidence: Errors
and Expectancies, 23 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 159, 178-82 (1999).
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averaging across the two probabilities), leading them to underestimate
the combined risk of incorrectly identifying a defendant. 5 '
Clearly, it is important that jurors do not fall victim to these falla-
cies when evaluating evidence, which can interfere with jurors' abilities
to comprehend the significance of numerical evidence and to draw ap-
propriate conclusions from it. It is also important that jurors receive ap-
propriate information to be able to effectively critique the evidence
presented to them.
B. Difficulty Critiquing Statistics Given by Experts
A second issue that arises when jurors are considering statistical
evidence is that jurors face difficulties in evaluating claims made by ex-
perts in cases in which complex statistical issues bear on the validity of
the experts' conclusions. One area in which this is important is in picking
a "reference population" when calculating probabilities. This is a defined
population which is used to calculate the probability of an event occur-
ring. In the case of DNA evidence and RMPs, this would be the popula-
tion chosen to determine the probability of a match occurring
coincidentally. For example, if it is reported that there is a 1 in 1,000
chance that a Caucasian male would match the DNA, then the reference
group is Caucasian males. There are complex issues involved in choos-
ing a reference group, for example, in the case of DNA evidence, what
should be done when there is no information about the ethnic group of
the source of a DNA trace? And what should be done when there is DNA
from more than one source at a crime scene? 52
Without additional help, jurors are not necessarily equipped to eval-
uate whether an appropriate reference group has been picked, and how
sound the resulting conclusions are likely to be, which can lead to ac-
ceptance of the expert's conclusions about misleading statistical evi-
dence. For example, in one UK case, Sally Clark, a mother with two
infant children who had died suddenly, stood trial on charges that she
had murdered them.53 It was initially thought that the babies had died
from sudden infant death syndrome. A distinguished pediatrician, Dr.
Meadow, estimated that the probability of two children dying of sudden
infant death syndrome was around one in 73 million.54 This was widely
interpreted as meaning that the chance the mother was innocent was one
in 73 million (a variation of the prosecutor's fallacy described above).55
51 Id.
52 See Koehler, supra note 46, at 26; D. H. Kaye, Logical Relevance: Problems with the
Reference Population and DNA Mixtures in People v. Pizarro, 3 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK
211, 211 (2004).
53 R v. Clark [2003] EWCA Crim. 1020.
54 Id. at para. 96.
55 Id. at para. 105-08 (discussing this in the context of the appeal decision).
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After Dr. Meadow gave evidence that the chance of two sudden infant
death syndrome deaths in a family like hers was one in 73 million, he
went on to state:5 6
[I]t's the chance of backing that long odds outsider at the
Grand National, you know; let's say it's an 80 to I
chance, you back the winner last year, then the next year
there's another horse at 80 to 1 and it is still 80 to I and
you back it again and it wins. Now here we're in a situa-
tion that, you know, to get those odds of 73 million
you've got to back that 1 in 80 chance four years run-
ning . . . the chance of it happening four years running
we all know is extraordinarily unlikely. So it's the same
with these deaths. You have to say two unlikely events
have happened and together it's very, very, very
unlikely. 7
This statistic is incorrect for several reasons. The pediatrician sim-
ply took the chance of such a death occurring once (1/8,500), and multi-
plied it by itself to get the probability of the event occurring twice. He
mistakenly used the probability of such a death occurring in the general
population to calculate the probabilities of the first and the second deaths
of the children, incorrectly assuming that the events (the two deaths)
were independent. In fact, the probability for the second event should
have been calculated by looking at the probability of such a death in
families who have already had one case of sudden infant death. These
families could justifiably be in a high risk group as there could well be
environmental and/or genetic risk factors in the family.58 Despite the fact
that this statistic is incorrect, the evidence was given without objection
from the defense,59 and was not later identified as erroneous by the ap-
peal court (despite the appeal court recognizing that important qualifica-
tions were not given when presenting the evidence). 60
Sally Clark was convicted by the jury. Her conviction was later
overturned on appeal as it transpired that one of her sons had coloniza-
tion of staphylococcus aureus bacteria, indicating that he had died from
natural causes, but this evidence had not been disclosed to the defense.6'
56 Id. at para. 96.
57 Id. at para. 99.
58 See Letter from the President of the Royal Statistical Society to the Lord Chancellor
regarding the use of statistical evidence in court cases, (Jan. 23, 2002), http://www.rss.org.uk/
Images/PDF/influencing-change/rss-use-statistical-evidence-court-cases-2002.pdf.
59 Lisa Claydon, Law, Neuroscience, and Criminal Culpability, in LAW AND NEUROS-
CIENCE 141, 164 (Michael Freeman ed., 2011).
60 See Letter from the President of the Royal Statistical Society to the Lord Chancellor
regarding the use of statistical evidence in court cases, supra note 58.
61 R v. Clark [20031 EWCA Crim. 1020.
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At the appeal, the court also referenced the statistical evidence that had
been given in the first trial, stating that important qualifications were not
referred to by Dr. Meadow in this evidence to the jury and "thus it was
the headline figures of I in 73 million that would be uppermost in the
jury's minds with the evidence equated to the chances of backing four 80
to 1 winners of the Grand National in successive years." 6 2 This statistical
error, the inability of the jury to detect the error when evaluating the
evidence, and the failure of the defense attorney and the court to recog-
nize and highlight this error, likely led to the erroneous conviction.
Testifying experts like Dr. Meadow do make errors when dealing
with statistical evidence. In a 2003 article, Jonathan Koehler lists thirteen
cases from the late 1980s and early 1990s in which experts, the courts, or
both committed the source probability error described above. 6 3 For ex-
ample, in United States v. Jakobetz, it was stated that "The FBI . . .
calculated that there was one chance in 300 million that the DNA from
the semen sample could have come from someone in the Caucasian pop-
ulation other than Jakobetz"" and in People v. Lindsey it was stated that
"[a] genetic epidemiologist . . . testified . . . that the odds of someone
besides the defendant having the banding pattern appearing in the known
sample and in the forensic sample was one in 340 billion." 6 5
Being able to critically evaluate statistical evidence given by experts
is important for jurors. Arguably, it is even more important that lawyers
and judges are able to critically evaluate statistical evidence given by
experts. Lawyers are tasked with presenting and testing the evidence
through examination and cross-examination, and judges play a key
gatekeeping role.
C. Being Influenced by Existing Viewpoints
Finally, research suggests that all of us, including jurors, are influ-
enced by existing viewpoints when interpreting legal and scientific evi-
dence. 6 6 The phenomenon of motivated cognition occurs when decision
makers have a preference regarding the outcome of an evaluative task,
and are therefore more likely to arrive at that outcome by engaging in
inadvertently biased processes for accessing, constructing, and evaluat-
ing beliefs.6 7 This phenomenon has been shown to apply to jurors evalu-
62 Id. at para. 102.
63 Koehler, supra note 46, at 28.
64 United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F. 2d 786, 789 (2d Cir. 1991).
65 People v. Lindsey, 868 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Colo. App. 1993).
66 Avani Mehta Sood, Motivated Cognition in Legal Judgments-An Analytic Review, 9
ANN. REv. L. Soc. Sci. 307, 308-09 (2013).
67 Id.; see Kahan et al., supra note 25.
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ating expert presentation of scientific evidence including RMPs. 68
Specifically, research has shown that mock jurors with high levels of
education are more likely to be influenced by political and social view-
points when evaluating DNA evidence. 6 9 This could be important in how
jurors evaluate statistics.
In sum, interpreting and critiquing statistical evidence in order to
evaluate the strength of evidence presented in a jury trial can be chal-
lenging. The intrinsic demands of the task are further complicated by
well-known heuristics, biases, and the phenomenon of motivated
cognition.
II. EXTRACTING NUMBERS FROM MEANING
A far less explored area in which jurors have to deal with numbers
occurs when jurors have to generate numbers from their assessment of
qualitative evidence. This occurs most often when jurors make compen-
satory and punitive damage awards. It also occurs when they determine
the proportion of liability in contributory and comparative negligence
cases, and when they, rarely, are asked to undertake criminal sentencing.
This conversion of qualitative to quantitative judgments is central to
many legal decisions, especially in the civil context. 70 Researchers have
found some reassuring evidence that jurors are generally able to rank
order the severity of injuries and the seriousness of crimes.7' For exam-
ple, compensatory damage awards are correlated with the severity of the
plaintiff's injury, punitive damage awards are correlated with the size of
compensatory awards, and criminals who commit serious offenses gener-
ally spend more time in prison than those who commit less heinous
crimes.72
Despite this, jurors typically make assessments about individual
cases in isolation, without looking at comparable cases, so ensuring that
similar cases are treated alike is left to judges and the appeals process. In
addition, these cases naturally involve a large amount of ambiguity be-
cause of limited guidance from the court and the difficulty of assigning
68 Rebecca K. Helm & James P. Dunlea, Motivated Cognition and Juror Interpretation
of Scientific Evidence: Applying Cultural Cognition to Interpretation of Forensic Testimony,
120 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2016).
69 Id.
70 See Valerie P. Hans, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Emily G. Owens, Editors' Introduction to
Judgment by the Numbers: Converting Qualitative to Quantitative Judgments in Law, 8 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (2011).
71 See Theodore Eisenberg, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Martin T. Wells, Reconciling Experi-
mental Incoherence with Real- World Coherence in Punitive Damages, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1239,
1240-41 (2002).
72 Id.
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value to factors that are often intangible.73 This has led to criticisms of
the variability, unpredictability, and bias in juror decisions. 74 These tasks
would likely be challenging for any decision maker,75 and jurors recog-
nize the difficulty of these tasks. 76 Thus, it is important to identify what
the challenges are for jurors, and how these challenges can be
ameliorated.
A. Inconsistency and Unpredictability of Juror Awards
It has been argued that the translation of moral judgments into dol-
lars and years is not grounded in principle, and so it produces large dif-
ferences among people.77 Numerical awards made by jurors are often
highly variable, even when jurors agree on qualitative aspects of a case.78
One experimental study using jury-eligible respondents examined judg-
ments of the outrageousness of a defendant's actions and also judgments
of punitive dollar awards made by individuals and by synthetic juries. 79
This study showed that there was substantial consensus among jurors on
the outrageousness of a defendant's actions and the appropriate severity
of punishment, but that judgments of dollar awards were much more va-
riable.80 Notably, even those who agreed on the outrageousness of the
defendant's actions and the appropriate severity of punishment differed
in their dollar award amounts.81 This convergence on qualitative judg-
ments and variability in dollar award recommendations has also been
shown in other work. 82
Researchers have identified multiple sources of ambiguity involved
in reaching numerical judgments in such cases including limited gui-
73 Valerie F. Reyna, Valerie P. Hans, Jonathan C. Corbin, Ryan Yeh, Kelvin Lin & Caisa
Royer, The Gist of Juries: Testing a Model of Damage Award Decision Making, 21 PSYCHOL.
PUB. PoL'Y & L. 280, 280-81 (2015).
74 Eisenberg, Rachlinski & Wells, supra note 72.
75 See KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT is LIFE WORTH?: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE 9/11
FUND AND ITS EFFORT TO COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF SEPTEMBER I ITH (2006) (describing
the difficulty of assigning monetary value to the loss of life).
76 See Shari Seidman Diamond, What Jurors Think: Expectations and Reactions of Citi-
zens Who Serve as Jurors, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM, 282 (Robert E.
Litan ed., 1993).
77 Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade & Ilana Ritov, Predictably Inco-
herent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1155-56 (2002).
78 Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade & Cass R. Sunstein, Shared Outrage and Erratic
Awards: The Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49, 49-50 (1998).
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 50.
82 Roselle L. Wissler, Allen J. Hart & Michael J. Saks, Decisionmaking About General
Damages: A Comparison of Jurors, Judges, and Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REv. 751, 757-58
(1999).
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dance, uncertainty of projections, and intangible losses.83 Another ambi-
guity can result when jurors do not understand the meaning of the
numbers given in context (for example that $100,000 is a small amount
of punitive damages to a company like the fast food corporation McDon-
ald's). This means jurors can understand a case, but end up giving an
arbitrary damage award amount. 8 4 This ambiguity likely contributes to
the substantial variance observed in both judge and juror damage
awards.85 This is exacerbated by the fact that jurors, unlike judges, con-
sider cases in isolation and do not have comparable cases to refer to.86 In
fact, in many cases lawyers are actually barred from referring to awards
in other cases.8 7 This can lead to inconsistency in numerical awards
across cases. For example, someone who has endured less pain and suf-
fering might receive a higher damage award than someone who has en-
dured more pain and suffering. 8
Juries face a particularly ambiguous situation in determining mone-
tary damages in personal injury cases. For example, in tort cases, juries
are tasked with putting plaintiffs in the position that they would have
been in had the tort not occurred. This involves assessing and quantifying
both economic and non-economic losses, some of which are intangible.
What, for example, is the numerical worth of becoming incontinent, or of
losing function in one lung? Dollar awards are an unbounded scale; al-
though the minimum award is set at zero, there is no maximum award
amount. Judgments made on unbounded scales tend to be more variable
than judgments made on bounded scales with pre-set minimum and max-
imum levels.89
The unpredictability built into damage awards creates opportunities
for unequal treatment of similar cases, and makes it difficult for insur-
ance agents, lawyers, and others who worry about their inability to pre-
dict jury awards. In turn, that makes it difficult to assess in advance
whether to take a case to trial or settle to avoid disastrous awards. 90 This
may also harm litigants, whether the harm is to plaintiffs who receive
very low awards that do not cover the costs of their injuries, or the harm
is to defendants who may be ordered to pay substantial judgments be-
83 Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary R. Rose, Beth Murphy & John Meixner, Damage
Anchors on Real Juries, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 148, 148-49 (2011).
84 Reyna et al., supra note 73.
85 Id.; Hans & Reyna, supra note 36.
86 Sunstein et al., supra note 77, at 1156.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 1155.
89 Kahneman et al., supra note 78.
90 Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Maria Hartwig, Par Anders Granhag & Elizabeth F. Loftus,
Insighiful or Wishful: Lawyers' Ability to Predict Case Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL., PuB. POL'Y,
& L. 133, 133-34 (2010).
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yond their ability to pay. 91 On the other hand, some commentators have
pointed out that the comparative unpredictability of trial decisions in-
creases the power of the courts and the jury to deter wrongful and harm-
ful behavior.92
B. Biasing Influences
Biasing factors can detrimentally affect numerical award amounts
given by jurors, even when they are irrelevant to the case. The well-
documented anchoring heuristic offers a case in point.93 Anchors are
numbers that can readily bias numerical judgments by being used as a
starting point that people fail to adjust from sufficiently.94 Thus, subjects
who see a high number (a high anchor) before giving a damage award
amount have been shown to give larger awards than those who see a low
number (a low anchor) before giving a damage award amount.95 This is
also the case in sentencing decisions made by judges. 96 One study
showed that providing criminal trial judges with unrealistically high sen-
tencing options led them to subsequently give longer sentences to de-
fendants in criminal cases, even when they were told the suggestion of
the original option was a mistake.97
Virtually all anchoring research has been conducted using meaning-
less anchor numbers. 98 People have been asked to consider whether an
appropriate estimate is above or below one's telephone number or rou-
lette wheel number, for example. 99 Recent research has extended the
study of anchors to look at "meaningful" anchors.100 These are anchors
that are meaningful and relevant in determining what a damage award
amount should be. For example, information on the average annual in-
come may convey useful information about the likely value of a particu-
91 Valerie P. Hans, Rebecca K. Helm & Valerie F. Reyna, From Meaning to Money:
Translating Injury into Dollars (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
92 Stephan Landsman, Introduction, 60 DEPAUL L. REv. 271, 271 (2011) ("[Llawyers
abhor uncertainty . . . [but] this denigrates the value of uncertainty, something that may be
critical to the deterrence of misconduct . . .").
93 See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLow, 124-26 (2011).
94 Gretchen B. Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, Anchoring, Activation, and the Construction
of Values, 79 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & Hum. DECISION PROCESSEs 115, 115-16 (1999).
95 See Diamond, et al., supra note 83, at 152-53; Verlin B. Hinsz & Kristin E. Indahl,
Assimilation to Anchors for Damage Awards in a Mock Civil Trial, 25 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 991, 992-94 (1995); Mollie W. Marti & Roselle L. Wissler, Be Careful What You
Ask For: The Effect of Anchors on Personal Injury Damage Awards, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. APPLIED 91, 92 (2000); Reyna et al., supra note 73, at 288.
96 Birte Englich & Thomas Mussweiler, Sentencing Under Uncertainty: Anchoring Ef-
fects in the Courtroom, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1535, 1540-41 (2001).
97 Id. at 1546-47.
98 For a summary of research on anchoring, see KAHNEMAN, supra note 93, at 117.
99 Chapman & Johnson, supra note 94, at 116.
100 Reyna et al., supra note 73, at 283-84.
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lar dollar award amount to a plaintiff. Importantly, meaningful anchors
have been shown to influence mock jurors more than meaningless
anchors.' 0 This suggests that when jurors do have reference points that
should be relevant to their decisions, these will be more influential than
meaningless numerical amounts.
Juror numerical awards have also been shown to be influenced by
juror characteristics, such as financial status and juror attitudes towards
civil litigation. For example, higher income jurors tend to recommend
larger dollar awards,1 0 2 and jurors who are more critical of civil litigation
tend to give lower awards.' 0 3 The influence of numerical anchors and
individual juror characteristics on quantitative judgments made by jurors
suggests that such judgments from one case to the next could vary, de-
pendent upon the use of anchors and the makeup of the jury. That could
lead to inequitable outcomes.
Another area in which jurors are required to make numerical judg-
ments is when they are required to consider contributory or comparative
negligence of the plaintiff in a civil lawsuit. Tort law provides that a
defendant can raise a plaintiffs own failure to act reasonably as a de-
fense in a negligence action. Damages awarded to the plaintiff can be
reduced or even eliminated based on this negligence.1 0 4 In these cases,
jurors must determine the proportion of the blame attributable to the
plaintiff's own negligence. 0 5 In the United States, jurisdictions either
employ a pure comparative negligence approach, whereby a plaintiffs
recovery is reduced in accordance with the plaintiff's share of responsi-
bility regardless of what that proportion is, or a modified comparative
negligence approach, where a plaintiff is barred from recovery when the
plaintiffs negligence reaches 50% or 51%.106
Research has shown that the extent to which the jury finds the plain-
tiff to have been negligent is influenced by the law they are being asked
to apply.' 0 7 In one study examining awards from 2001-2005, researchers
found that in pure comparative negligence jurisdictions, juries found that
the plaintiffs responsibility exceeded 50% in 22% of cases, while in
modified comparative negligence jurisdictions, the plaintiffs responsi-
bility was only found to exceed 50% in 7.5% of cases. 0 8 When making
101 Id. at 285-86.
102 Wissler et al., supra note 82, at 783.
103 Valerie P. Hans, What's It Worth? Jury Damage Awards as Community Judgments, 55
WM. & MARY L. REV. 935, 952-53 (2014).
104 JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & VALERIE P. HANS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TORT LAW 150
(2016).
105 Id. at 150-52.
106 Id.
107 Eli K. Best & John J. Donohue III, Jury Nullification in Modified Comparative Negli-
gence Regimes, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 945, 945-46 (2012).
1os ROBBENNOLT & HANS, supra note 104, at 154.
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their determinations, jurors are clearly influenced by the recovery they
believe would be just, rather than strictly determining the numerical pro-
portion of plaintiff liability, which can shift their numerical judgments. It
is also likely that in modified comparative negligence states when num-
bers around 50% are specifically mentioned as cut-offs, that these num-
bers will serve as anchors, influencing determinations of plaintiff
responsibility.1 09
To minimize errors and biases when jurors deal with numerical in-
formation, an understanding of how people process numerical informa-
tion and how this can lead to cognitive errors and bias is essential. As in
Section I, which illustrated the challenges of moving from numbers to a
meaningful qualitative judgment, Section II summarized problems con-
fronting decision makers when they must translate their qualitative judg-
ments into numerical decisions. We now turn to relevant psychological
theory and potential remedies.
III. THEORY AND RESEARCH ON NUMERICAL DECISION MAKING
Psychological theory and research provides insight into people's
ability to understand and use numerical information in decision making.
First, and unsurprisingly, numeracy has been shown to improve the abil-
ity to deal with numbers in many contexts. For example, people will be
unable to make accurate judgments if they do not know what a decimal
point means, or what the "/" means in a fraction." 0 This can lead to
inaccurate conclusions, such as 1/3 + 1/2 = 1/5.
Ellen Peters and her colleagues conducted four studies comparing
individuals who were high or low in numeracy on decisions that required
understanding of probability and statistics."' The highly numerate indi-
viduals were more likely than those with low numeracy to understand
and employ appropriate numerical principles, which made the highly nu-
merate people less susceptible to framing effects.1 2 Those lower in
numeracy were affected more by irrelevant or affective factors.' '3 In one
study, for example, participants read about a psychiatric hospital patient
and were asked to judge how much risk it would pose to release the
patient. 114 Half of them read the "frequency" version ("Of every 100
patients similar to Mr. Jones, 10 are estimated to commit an act of vio-
109 Id. at 157-58.
110 See Valerie F. Reyna & Charles J. Brainerd, The Importance of Mathematics in Health
and Human Judgment: Numeracy, Risk Communication and Medical Decision Making, 17
LEARNING & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 147, 147-48 (2007).
111 Ellen Peters, Daniel Vastfjall, Paul Slovic, C.K. Mertz, Ketti Mazzocco & Stephan
Dickert, Numeracy and Decision Making, 17 PSYCHOL. Sci. 407 (2006).
112 Id. at 408.
113 Id. at 412-13.
114 Id. at 409.
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lence to others during the first several months after discharge"); the other
read the "percentage" format (Of every 100 patients similar to Mr. Jones,
"10% are estimated" to commit an act of violence to others during the
first several months after discharge)." 5 The actual risk (10 of 100, or
10%) is equivalent. Compared to those lower in numeracy, those with
strong number skills were better able to identify the equivalency of the
probability and frequency frames in the presentation of potential risk,
and to use the insight appropriately in decision making." 6
However, it is clear that numeracy is not a panacea." 7 More recent
research suggests that what is most important is understanding the mean-
ing of numbers, rather than just details and arithmetic.' 18 As we will
discuss below, this research provides insight into how numerical infor-
mation should be presented to jurors, and suggests that systematic biases
could actually be introduced by selecting only highly numerate jurors.
We focus here on fuzzy-trace theory, a psychological theory of
memory and decision making that predicts and explains many findings in
the literature on numeracy and decision-making, particularly in the medi-
cal decision-making context.' '9 Fuzzy-trace theory distinguishes between
verbatim and gist representations of information. Verbatim representa-
tions capture the surface form of information (for example exact words
or numbers), while gist representations capture its meaning or interpreta-
tion (based on context, and other factors known to affect meaning).1 2 0
So, for example, take an individual who is considering bungee jumping.
A 10% chance of rain may be considered a low chance in the context of
deciding whether to perform a bungee jump, but a 10% chance of death
would likely be considered a high chance. Similarly, a $100,000 punitive
damage award may be considered a huge amount for a private individual
defendant but only a small amount for a corporate defendant. Research
has shown that people encode both verbatim and gist representations of
information separately, and that each typically forms the basis of a differ-
ent kind of reasoning--one focused on precise details (verbatim-based
processing) and the other on understanding global meaning (gist-based
processing). 121
There are multiple stages to encoding information and using it to
make a decision, and therefore there are various stages at which errors
can be introduced into decision making. The information must be heard,
and encoded as a representation, the information must then be retrieved
115 Id.
116 Id.
I 17 See Reyna et al., supra note 15, at 943.
118 See Reyna et al., supra note 73, at 281.
119 Reyna et al., supra note 15, at 965-66.
120 Id. at 965.
121 Id.
2017] 125
126 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 27:107
appropriately, and finally the information must be processed and inte-
grated, along with other information, as part of the decision-making pro-
cess. When an individual is making a decision, errors can therefore occur
in multiple ways.
First, errors can occur due to a lack of knowledge or a failure to
encode information in the appropriate way. For example, a juror might
believe a statistic given to them by an expert because they do not have
sufficient knowledge themselves to critique the information that the ex-
pert is giving, as in the Sally Clark case. In addition, a juror who did not
understand what the "/" in a fraction meant would not be able to accu-
rately draw conclusions from evidence given in the form of fractions.
Inconsistencies in damage award amounts can also be caused by a lack of
background knowledge giving jurors little on which to base their deci-
sions. Errors that occur due to a lack of knowledge can be cured by
providing jurors with the necessary knowledge that they need to under-
stand and interpret information. Errors can also occur due to a failure to
retrieve appropriate knowledge in context. These errors can be cured by
cueing the knowledge relevant to properly deal with numbers.1 22
However, errors can, and often do, occur due to processing interfer-
ence rather than a lack of knowledge or failure to retrieve knowledge.
These errors occur despite jurors having the relevant knowledge to avoid
biases, due to confusion when information is being processed. A set of
common errors occurring due to processing interference are class-inclu-
sion errors. Class-inclusion errors can occur when people deal with over-
lapping sets and subsets. For example, if 3/100 people are a DNA match,
we have an overlapping set and subset since the subset of 3 in the numer-
ator is also included in the overall set of 100. These overlapping numbers
are confusing and can interfere with processing, which in turn can lead to
biases such as focusing on the numerator in a fraction and neglecting the
denominator. For example, people show a tendency to judge a low
probability event as more likely when presented as a large numbered
ratio (a 10/100 chance of an event occurring) than when it is presented as
an equivalent smaller numbered ratio (for example, 1/10), despite know-
ing that the two are numerically equivalent.1 23 Processing errors are often
simple bookkeeping errors that can be cured by presenting information
clearly to avoid confusion. Although greater numeracy helps to the ex-
tent that understanding a number is necessary to have a basic understand-
122 See C. J. Brainerd & V. F. Reyna, Autosuggestibility in Memory Development, 28
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 65, 96-97 (1995); see V. F. Reyna & C. J. Brainerd, Fuzzy-Trace The-
ory: An Interim Synthesis, 7 LEARNING & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 1, 35-44 (1995).
123 See Valerie F. Reyna & Charles J. Brainerd, The Origins of Probability Judgment: A
Review of Data and Theories, in SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY 255 (George Wright & Peter Ayton
eds., 1994).
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ing of what it means, these errors are committed even by numerate
individuals. 124
Many of the errors that have been shown to occur when jurors deal
with numbers are processing errors.1 2 5 To illustrate, let's return to the
case of RMPs. As described above, jurors are more likely to be con-
vinced by DNA evidence when RMPs are presented as probabilities (e.g.
a .001 chance of a random match) rather than frequencies (e.g. a 1 in
1,000 chance of a random match). This is likely to be because they neg-
lect the denominator in the frequency and focus on .001 and 1. As .001 is
much lower than 1, the chance of a RMP seems smaller.
Class-inclusion errors are also responsible for more complex errors,
such as the prosecutor's fallacy (when people equate the RMP with the
probability that the defendant is innocent), and the difficulty in dealing
with two potential sources of error. These errors can be compared to
errors in assessing risk of a disease, errors that have been shown to occur
due to overlapping classes. Take the following example:
The pretest probability of a disease is 10% and a diag-
nostic test has 80% sensitivity (80% of people with the
disease test positive) and 80% specificity (80% of people
without the disease test negative). Is the probability that
a specific individual who has a positive test result has
the disease closer to 30% or 70%?
Ignoring the denominator here (which is far smaller for the group
having the disease than the group who do not have the disease due to the
pretest probability of 10%) leads to confusing the probability of a posi-
tive result given the disease, with the probability of the disease given a
positive result. This means that most people (even medical experts) say
that the probability is closer to 70%, when the correct answer is closer to
30%. 126 This error can be corrected by using 2x2 tables or Venn dia-
grams (diagrams using overlapping circles to show different classes and
their areas of overlap) to separate classes from one another. For example,
the above problem can be illustrated in Table 1, the 2x2 table below:
124 Brainerd & Reyna, supra note 122, at 19.
125 Valerie F. Reyna, How People Make Decisions That Involve Risk: A Dual-Process
Approach, 13 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. Sci. 60 (2004).
126 Id. at 64-65.
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TABLE 1. TWO-BY-TWO TABLE CLEARLY SEPARATING CLASSES TO
PROMOTE ACCURATE REASONING WHEN INTERPRETING
OUTCOMES OF BREAST CANCER SCREENING
Chance of Chance of
positive test negative test Totals
Breast cancer 8 2 10
No breast cancer 18 72 90
Totals 26 74 100
Table 1 makes it clear that if a test result is positive, the chance of
having breast cancer is 8/26 (around 30%) and the chance of not having
breast cancer is 18/26 (around 70%). This information can also be
communicated using simple visual aids. Figure 1 illustrates the following
scenario:
Ten percent of people in a population have a disease. A
test is available to detect the disease. This test has 100%
sensitivity (100% of people with the disease test posi-
tive) and 80% specificity (80% of people without the
disease test negative).
In Figure 1, a sad face indicates a person with the disease, and a happy
face indicates a person without the disease. As ten percent of the people
in the population have the disease, we start off with one out of ten faces
being sad, and nine out of ten faces being happy.
FIGURE 1. VISUAL AID TO REDUCE CONFUSION FROM OVERLAPPING
CLASSES
Expected to test positive (+) Expected to test negative (-)
Note. Sad face represents a person with the disease; happy face represents a person without the
disease. Plus sign indicates a positive test result; minus sign indicates a negative test result.
Because only 80% of people without the disease test negative, 20%
of people without the disease test positive. This means of nine people
without the disease, we would expect around seven to test negative and
two to test positive (as we can see in Figure 1). Therefore, as Figure 1
makes clear, in this scenario, even if someone receives a positive test
result, it is more likely than not that they do not have the disease.
In order to reduce errors, it is important to identify how they arise.
Errors resulting from a lack of knowledge can often be reduced by pro-
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viding background knowledge and training. While background informa-
tion can also be important in preventing processing errors, how
information is presented has also been shown to be vitally important in
reducing these errors. 127 Understanding how people process information
can provide insight into how these errors arise, and how they can be
reduced.
When people are making decisions, they have a tendency to rely on
gist (simple and meaning-based) rather than verbatim (detailed and sur-
face-level) representations. 12 8 According to fuzzy-trace theory, reliance
on gist has important advantages in decision making as it involves in-
sightful processing based on understanding a stimulus, rather than just
precise and analytical calculation. It is likely true that in some cases, for
example, damage award cases in which awards for potential future dam-
age are calculated by the probability of that damage occurring multiplied
by the value of that damage, or cases in which percentages of profits
must be calculated, precise numerical knowledge will be important.
However, in many other cases, what will be more important is an under-
standing of the meaning of numbers in context. Is a $100,000 award for
pain and suffering high or low, given the context? Likewise, is a 10%
chance of having a random DNA match high or low? Put simply, what is
most important in many cases is understanding the meaning of numbers
in a given context, rather than precise numerical values. Reliance on
meaning (rather than precise and detailed numbers) has been shown to
reduce processing errors, including the class-inclusion errors described
above. 129 Therefore, what is likely to be very important in interventions
is ensuring jurors can understand what each number means in the context
in which it is presented.
This is also the case in damage award decision making. A model of
juror damage award decision making based on these and other insights
from fuzzy-trace theory has been proposed.' 3 0 The Hans-Reyna model
posits that jurors first make simple gist judgments, specifically categori-
cal (damages are warranted or not) and ordinal (the damages deserved
are low, medium, or high). Jurors then search for a dollar award amount
that fits the gist judgments. It is this conversion of gist judgments to
precise dollar amounts that is most influenced by heuristics, as jurors rely
on anchors or symbolic numbers from everyday life that have meaning to
them personally as low or high numbers to assign a numerical value to
the gist of the case. '3 This is consistent with research showing that ju-
127 Reyna et al., supra note 15, at 958-59.
128 Id. at 966.
129 Id.
130 Reyna et al., supra note 73, at 282-84.
131 Id., at 291.
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rors tend to converge on evaluations of qualitative aspects of a case, but
not damage award amounts.1 32 Importantly, the Hans-Reyna model also
predicts that meaningful anchor amounts will be more influential than
meaningless anchor amounts. This is because meaningful numbers pro-
vide greater insight into whether a particular amount is low or high. This
prediction has been supported by experimental research.1 3 3
We now consider ways to help jurors dealing with numbers, based
on this research on numerical cognition.
IV. WHAT CAN HELP JURORS DEALING WITH NUMBERS?
A. Numeracy
As noted above, unsurprisingly, strong numerical skills can help
when making decisions involving numbers. This is likely to be the case
where errors are prone to occur due to a lack of knowledge. For example,
knowledge of multiplication will help jurors calculating damages for po-
tential future harm (typically calculated by multiplying the risk of the
future harm by its magnitude), and knowledge of appropriate reference
groups can provide assistance to jurors critiquing expert evidence. As-
sembling juries that are highly numerate to consider numerical evidence
or to deliver numerical verdicts may be considered one way to improve
how jurors cope with numbers. As we noted earlier, this can be done by
assembling "blue-ribbon" juries drawn from highly educated or trained
subgroups of the population in complex cases. More highly educated ju-
ries can also be formed as a consequence of jury selection, if lawyers
base their peremptory challenges on education and training. In the Apple
v. Samsung trial, for instance, potential jurors were extensively ques-
tioned to assess their likely understanding of the complex evidence they
would hear at trial.1 3 4
Juror numeracy can serve as a partial protective factor for decision
making, which is encouraging news. However, fuzzy-trace theory and
associated research suggests that this is not a wholly sufficient strategy to
solve all problems that arise when jurors deal with numbers. First, re-
search suggests that numeracy does not make a difference in many types
of legal decisions involving numbers. This is because the errors and bi-
ases shown by jurors when dealing with numbers are usually associated
with the processing of information, rather than a lack of knowledge.' 35
Research shows that even highly educated and numerate individuals are
132 Kahneman et al., supra note 79, at 49.
133 Reyna et al., supra note 73, at 285-86.
134 Bajwa, supra note 2, at 91.
135 Reyna et al., supra note 125.
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not immune to making processing errors.' 3 6 When it comes to damage
awards, the decisions of more numerate jurors do not necessarily differ
from those of less numerate jurors, even when numbers are involved. For
example, experimental research to date has found no influence of numer-
acy on damage award amounts.' 3 7 Recent research has also supported the
idea that more numerate jurors may find certain numerical judgments
more difficult than less numerate jurors (specifically in the converting
meaning into numbers cases), by showing that in a mock personal injury
case where a damage award amount for pain and suffering needed to be
given, jurors with higher numeracy reported that it was more difficult to
decide on a damage award.1 3 8
In addition, there is new, albeit limited, research evidence that in
some highly charged scientific areas, selecting more numerate jurors
could paradoxically increase biases in juror decision making. Empirical
research on scientific evidence about climate change suggests that as in-
dividuals become more scientifically literate, they can also become more
biased when evaluating polarizing scientific evidence. 3 9 This research
suggests that more knowledgeable individuals could be more prone to
motivated cognition, perhaps due to an increased ability to interpret evi-
dence to fit a pre-existing viewpoint.1 4 0
Furthermore, research suggests that it is vital for jurors to under-
stand the meaning of numbers in context as well as their quantitative
value. 141 Some people may have an ability to perform numerical calcula-
tions, but not to understand the meaning of numbers in context.1 4 2 Se-
lecting jurors based on numerical ability could lead to juries with good
technical skills, but with a lack of insight beyond the calculation of num-
bers. Thinking literally by focusing on accurate technical details may
interfere with assessing gist and meaning, for example assessing the gist
of the pain and suffering of another person in order to convert this into a
damage award. 143 Anticipating an injured person's career trajectory and
valuing the worth of an individual's life or pain and suffering, as juries
136 See Gretchen B. Chapman & Jingjing Liu, Numeracy, Frequency, and Bayesian Rea-
soning, 4 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 34 (2009); Reyna, supra note 126; Valerie F. Reyna
& Mary B. Adam, Fuzzy-Trace Theory, Risk Communication, and Product Labeling in Sexu-
ally Transmitted Diseases, 23 RISK ANALYSIs 325 (2003).
137 See Brian H. Bornstein, The Impact of Different Types of Expert Scientific Testimony
on Mock Jurors' Liability Verdicts, 10 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 429 (2004); Hans et al., supra
note 91.
138 Hans et al., supra note 91.
139 Helm & Dunlea, supra note 69; Kahan et al., supra note 25, at 732.
140 Id.
141 Valerie F. Reyna & Charles J. Brainerd, Dual Processes in Decision Making and
Developmental Neuroscience: A Fuzzy-Trace Model, 31 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 180 (2011).
142 Id.
143 See id. (giving further information and explaining the relationship between autistic
traits and meaning-based processing).
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are required to do, require insights and judgments that go beyond the
mere calculation of numbers. Reflecting on the judgments he had to
make as special master of the Congressionally-mandated 9/11 fund to
allocate money to the many victims and their families who had suffered
losses in the terrorist attacks, Kenneth R. Feinberg said, "It was a job that
called for the wisdom of Solomon, the technical skill of H&R Block, and
the insight of a mystic with a crystal ball. I was supposed to peer into that
crystal ball, consider the ebbs and flows that made up a stranger's life,
and translate all of this into dollars and cents." 44 A jury drawn from a
representative cross-section of the community is better able to reflect the
broad range of local perspectives, and the jury's decision in turn will
better reflect the community's norms and values.1 45
A final but very significant problem with blue-ribbon juries is that
they do not fully represent the population at large. The evaluation of trial
evidence and the assessment of credibility of litigants and witnesses draw
importantly on the decision makers' knowledge, past experiences, and
perspectives. Selecting jurors based on education alone would remove
significant sources of insight from the jury that decides the case.
B. Training and Warnings
Another approach is to attempt to educate jurors during a trial, and
when necessary, to alert them to potential biases and errors.1 46 It is im-
portant to ensure that jurors are capable of understanding numbers that
are involved in a case, that jurors are walked carefully through all numer-
ical calculations, and that jurors are provided with appropriate informa-
tion with which to critique expert opinions based on numbers. This is
particularly important in preventing errors based on knowledge and re-
trieval. For example, it may allow jurors to spot errors in expert testi-
mony or to more accurately calculate profits from a financial
spreadsheet.
There is also evidence that processing errors can be prevented by
providing cues to assist jurors in avoiding those errors.1 47 For example,
by reminding jurors that a 1/10 risk is the same as a 10/100 risk, incon-
sistencies in the ascription of meaning to these fractions can be reduced,
as jurors will recognize that treating them differently is illogical.
144 FEINBERG, supra note 75, at 87.
145 Hans, supra note 103, at 963-64.
146 Anne W. Reed, The ABCs of Tutoring Your Jury, 42 TRIAL TECHNIQUEs 20 (2007)
(proposing that we should attempt to train prospective jurors in advance of trial and eliminate
those who fail to improve); See Jonathan J. Koehler, Train Our Jurors (Faculty Working
Papers, Paper 141, 2006), http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestem.edu/facultyworkingpa-
pers/141.
14' See Reyna, supra note 126.
TRIAL BY NUMBERS
Judges have advocated the educational approach to dealing with nu-
merical challenges in trial evidence.1 48 For example, in one case consid-
ering the risk of the prosecutor's fallacy in jurors dealing with random
match probabilities, the United States District Court in New Hampshire
stated "if a trial judge concludes that jurors could be confused by statisti-
cal evidence, the judge can deliver carefully crafted instructions to insure
that the evidence is properly understood." 4 9
However, it is important to note that general warnings are unlikely
to be a panacea for all of the issues that surround dealing with numbers.
In order to be effective, warnings and training have to be carefully de-
signed based on the errors that jurors may be susceptible to in a particu-
lar case. In the Sally Clark case discussed above, the judge in the first
case did give a warning regarding the statistical evidence, he stated:
I should, I think, members of the jury just sound a word
of caution about the statistics. However compelling you
may find them to be, we do not convict people in these
courts on statistics. It would be terrible day if that were
so. If there is one SIDS (sudden infant death syndrome)
death in a family, it does not mean that there cannot be
another one in the same family.15 0
Although this warning did alert jurors that a defendant should not be
convicted based on statistics, it was relatively vague and so would be
unlikely to give the jurors the knowledge they would need to critique the
statistics effectively and to reject the incorrect figure offered by the pros-
ecution's expert.
Statistical training may be valuable for jurors. But it may be even
more essential for judges and attorneys so that they can recognize when
calling an expert in statistics may be important, and when jurors are
likely to need guidance. We've illustrated the potential biasing effects of
framing the presentation of statistical information in particular ways.
Thus, training and warnings should be accompanied by presenting nu-
merical evidence to jurors in a way that helps them in processing that
information and drawing appropriate conclusions from it. Below we con-
sider some ways that the meaning of numbers can be conveyed to jurors,
and how this can help to avoid processing errors and inconsistencies.
C. Providing Meaning Through Visual Aids
As noted above, informed decisions depend on being given accurate
information, and also through truly comprehending the meaning of that
148 See United States v. Shea, 957 F. Supp. 331, 345 (D.N.H. 1997).
149 Id.
150 R v. Clark [2003] EWCA Crim. 1020, at para. 104.
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information. Many errors that occur when jurors deal with numbers are
due to difficulty processing precise numerical details, particularly over-
lapping classes. It is important in preventing these errors that jurors com-
prehend the meaning of numerical amounts in context. The first step in
communicating meaning to jurors is to identify the meaning of the num-
bers in evidence--the "bottom line" of the information. Expert knowl-
edge is important in extracting this meaning. For example, an expert can
tell jurors whether a particular number is low or high in a given context
(e.g. whether a random match probability of 1 in 1000 is considered high
in the field). This information can then be communicated to jurors along-
side precise numerical values.
One way to effectively communicate the meaning of information in
addition to precise numbers, while also avoiding the errors associated
with focus on precise numbers, is to use visual aids and graphs. 51 These
aids should be specifically designed to convey meaning and to avoid er-
rors associated with processing--such as class-inclusion errors.1 52 Visual
aids such as column graphs, pie charts, 2x2 tables, and Venn diagrams
can be used to clearly display probabilities and reduce processing
interference.1 5 3
First, column graphs and pie charts can be used to make clear rela-
tive magnitudes.1 5 4 Consider one of the biases described above based on
how information is framed. Jurors are more likely to be convinced by
DNA evidence when RMPs are presented as probabilities (e.g. a 0.1
chance of a random match) rather than frequencies (e.g. a 100 in 1,000
chance of a random match).' 55 If this information is presented in column
graphs or pie charts, it becomes clear that the two are equivalent to each
other (see Figures 2 and 3 below). This technique has been successfully
used to convey health related information to medical patients.1 56
151 See Wolfgang Gaissmaier, Odette Wegwarth, David Skopec, Anne-Sophie Miller, Se-
bastian Broschinski & Mary C. Politi, Numbers Can Be Worth a Thousand Pictures: Individ-
ual Differences in Understanding Graphical and Numerical Representations of Health-Related
Information, 31 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 286 (2012) (noting that not all visual aids improve
understanding).
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 See, e.g. Liana Fraenkel, Ellen Peters, Peter Charpentier, Blair Olsen, Lanette Errante,
Robert T. Schoen & Valerie Reyna, A Decision Tool to Improve the Quality of Care in Rheu-
matoid Arthritis, 64 ARTHRITIS CARE & REs. 977 (2012).
155 Koehler, supra note 31, at 502.
156 Fraenkel et al., supra note 154; Priscila G. Brust-Renck, Caisa E. Royer & Valerie F.
Reyna, Communicating Numerical Risk: Human Factors That Aid Understanding in Health
Care, 8 REVIEWS OF Hum. FACTORS & ERGONOMICS 235, 252-59 (2013).
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FIGURE 2. COLUMN GRAPHS SHOWING 100 IN 1,000 CHANCE AND 0.1
CHANCE OF A RANDOM DNA MATCH
1000 1
900 0.9
800 0.8
700 0.7
600 a Chance not 0.6 m Chance not
random random500 0.5
a Chance a Chance
400 random 0.4 random
300 0.3
200 0.2
100 0.1
0 0
Column graph displaying 100 in 1,000 chance Column graph displaying 0.1 chance
FIGURE 3. PIE CHARTS SHOWING 100 IN 1,000 CHANCE AND 0.1
CHANCE OF A RANDOM DNA MATCH
Chance random a Chance not random Chance random a Chance not random
10%0.
Pie chart displaying 100 in 1,000 chance Pie chart displaying .1 chance
In addition to being good tools to communicate relative magnitudes,
visual aids can be used to clearly separate classes from one another, in
order to avoid class inclusion errors and to clearly communicate the
meaning of statistics. Consider the following example (note that numbers
used are not intended to be of realistic magnitudes but are included for
illustrative purposes):
There is a group of sixteen suspects and it is thought that
one of them committed a crime. A DNA trace is found at
the scene of the crime and is a match to the defendant
(who is one of the sixteen subjects). It is not known
whether it is a match to the other suspects who are not
available for testing. We know that there is a random
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match probability of 20%, meaning that there is a 20%
chance of a match occurring by chance rather than be-
cause a defendant is the true source of a sample.
In this example, many people would assume that this meant there
was a 20% chance the defendant was innocent. This is an example of the
prosecutor's fallacy discussed above, in which people equate the
probability of the defendant being innocent given a match with the
probability that there would be a match given the defendant is innocent
(the random match probability). Using a visual aid like Figure 4 can help
show why this is not correct, and make the correct probabilities evident.
In Figure 4, the sad face is the true perpetrator, and the happy faces are
innocent suspects.
FIGURE 4. VISUAL AID SHOWING NUMBER OF EXPECTED MATCHES IN
SAMPLE OF 16 WHERE ONE OF THE SAMPLE IS GUILTY, AND
THERE IS A RANDOM MATCH PROBABILITY OF
20%
Expected to be a match (+) Expected to not be a match (-)
Note. Sad face represents a guilty suspect; happy face represents an innocent suspect. Plus sign
indicates a match; minus sign indicates not a match.
In this hypothetical, we expect the true source of the DNA trace (the
one guilty person) to be a match, but we would also expect three of the
remaining suspects to be a match since 20% of those who were not a true
source would be expected to match (and 20% of fifteen is three). This
means that given that the defendant is a match, there is a three-fourths
chance that he is not the true source of the sample, and a one-fourth
chance that he is the true source of the sample. Thus, even if we equate
being the source of a DNA sample with being guilty, in this scenario
there is only a one-fourth chance that the defendant is guilty. This tech-
nique can be used to help jurors in any cases where there is a risk of
processing errors due to overlapping classes.
Although in real cases it is unlikely that there will be a pool of
sixteen suspects, one of whom definitely committed the crime, it is im-
portant to estimate the probability that a defendant committed a crime
based on diverse pieces of evidence, and to take this probability into
account as one assesses the probative value of scientific evidence. In the
case of DNA evidence, this would be an estimate of the probability that
the defendant committed the crime, absent the DNA evidence. This could
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be high (because a lot of other evidence points to the defendant, or low
(because the defendant was identified through a DNA database search).
Considering the extent to which evidence other than DNA points towards
guilt (the likelihood of guilt excluding the DNA evidence) is highly im-
portant in cases in which a defendant is on trial based on a DNA match
from a database search, rather than due to other evidence.1 5 7 This is be-
cause in these cases, setting aside the DNA evidence, the probability that
the defendant left the sample is very small and thus the probability that a
match is truly random is higher.15 8
For example, assume that the random match probability is 1 in
1,000. If a suspect is identified in a case due to other overwhelming evi-
dence against her and then a DNA match is found, this is highly proba-
tive as to the likelihood of the suspect having committed the crime. If a
database of 1,000 people is searched, then a match would be expected
even if the person who was the true source of the sample was not in the
database. Defendants have made arguments that DNA evidence obtained
from database searches should be excluded on the basis that there is no
generally accepted scientific opinion on how the probative value of such
evidence should be quantified.' 5 9 This issue has been considered by ap-
pellate courts, including the California Supreme Court, which decided
that prosecutors may tell juries, in all cases of the rarity of finding a
defendant's DNA match, even when a database search has been used.' 6 0
When evidence from database searches are employed, it is particularly
important that processing errors are avoided, and jurors understand the
statistics that they are evaluating.
One way to make the meaning of statistics here clear (and to avoid
the prosecutor's fallacy and other processing errors) is to use visual aids,
such as 2x2 tables, Venn diagrams, or stacked column charts.161 Table 2
shows how a 2x2 table below can be used to display the different statis-
tics involved.
157 See People v. Xiong, 215 Cal. App. 4th 1259 (2013).
158 See David J. Balding & Peter Donnelly, Evaluating DNA Profile Evidence When the
Suspect is Identified Through a Database Search, 41 J. FORENSIC Sci. 603 (1996) (noting that
although DNA evidence in such cases has been shown to be just as strong as DNA evidence
from other cases, the suspect may be less likely to be guilty depending on the other evidence
provided).
159 See David H. Kaye, Rounding Up The Usual Suspects: A Legal and Logical Analysis
of DNA Trawling Cases, 87 N.C. L. REv. 425, 425 (2008).
160 People v. Nelson, 43 Cal. 4th 1242, 1267 (2008).
161 See Eric R. Stone, Winston R. Sieck, Benita E. Bull, J. Frank Yates, Stephanie C.
Parks & Carolyn J. Rush, Foreground: Background Salience: Explaining the Effects of Graph-
ical Displays on Risk Avoidance, 90 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & Hum. DECISION PROCESSES
19 (2003).
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TABLE 2. Two-BY-TWo TABLE TEMPLATE DESIGNED TO PRESENT
STATISTICS TO PREVENT THE PROSECUTORS FALLACY
Probability of Probability of
match (B) no match (Not B) Totals
Probability innocent Probability A and B Probability A Not B Probability of A =
(A)
Probability not Probability B Not A Probability Not A Probability Not A =
innocent (Not A) Not B
Totals Probability of B = Probability Not B = Total = 100%.
Table 2 shows that the probability of a defendant being innocent
given a match (Probability of A and B / Probability of B) is different
from the probability of the defendant being a match given that she is
innocent (Probability of A and B / Probability of A). Using such tables
(particularly when populated with accurate numbers) can help to
disentangle classes and make it easier for jurors to extract meaning from
statistics. Tables 3 and 4 are examples of how such tables could be
populated.
TABLE 3. TABLE DEPICTING A SITUATION IN WHICH THERE IS A PRE-
EXISTING PROBABILITY OF 1 IN 1000 THAT A DEFENDANT COMMITTED
A CRIME, A RANDOM MATCH PROBABILITY OF 1 IN 1000, AND A 0%
CHANCE THAT THE PERSON WHO THE RECOVERED SAMPLE WAS FROM
WOULD NOT BE A MATCH
Totals (based on
Chance of match Chance of no match existing evidence)
Person was true 0.1 (100% of 0.1) 0 (0% of 1) 0.1 (pre-existing
source of sample chance defendant
truly DNA source)
Person was not true 0.1 (0.1% of 99.9) 99.8 (99.9% of 99.9 (pre-existing
source of sample 99.9) chance defendant
(match was was not the source
coincidental) of the DNA)
Totals 0.2 99.8 100
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TABLE 4. TABLE DEPICTING A SITUATION IN WHICH THERE IS A PRE-
EXISTING PROBABILITY OF 90 IN 100 THAT A DEFENDANT COMMITTED
A CRIME, A RANDOM MATCH PROBABILITY OF 1 IN 1000, AND A 0%
CHANCE THAT THE PERSON WHO THE RECOVERED SAMPLE WAS FROM
WOULD NOT BE A MATCH
Totals (based on
Chance of match Chance of no match existing evidence)
Person was true 90 (100% of 90) 0 (0% of 90) 90 (pre-existing
source of sample chance defendant
truly DNA source)
Person was not true 0.01 (0.1% of 10) 9.99 (99.9% of 10) 10 (pre-existing
source of sample chance defendant
(match was was not the source
coincidental) of the DNA)
Totals 90.01 9.99 100
Table 3 illustrates a case where a DNA match is found in a database
of 1,000 people. Even if we know the real perpetrator is in the database,
the pre-existing chance of a person from the database being the real
perpetrator is 1 in 1,000. In contrast, Table 4 shows a case where a DNA
match is found in a suspect, and independent evidence suggests there is
around a 90% chance that she committed the crime. Of course, in real
legal cases, jurors would be unlikely to have precise statistical estimates
of guilt, but we use these figures and extreme examples to demonstrate
potential contrasts. We also assume that if a person is the source of a
DNA trace, he or she is the true perpetrator, although this would not
necessarily be the case.
Note that in Table 3 (where a defendant was identified in a database
search), even if there is a DNA match, the chance of the suspect being
the true source of the DNA recovered from the crime scene and the
chance of the match occurring by chance are equal (both 0.1/0.2). But
where significant independent evidence suggested guilt, the chance of the
defendant being the true source of the DNA recovered from the crime
scene is much higher-around 99.99% (the chance of a match if the
person was the true source which is 90 / the overall chance of a match
which is 90.01). Putting this information in tables and explaining it to
jurors can help jurors accurately extract meaning from numerical
evidence, avoiding processing errors such as the prosecutor's fallacy.
D. Providing Meaning Through Context
Understanding the context of a number can also assist jurors in un-
derstanding the meaning of the number and avoiding biases associated
with numerical decision making. In the context of DNA evidence, this
could be done by presenting verbal equivalents alongside RMPs to show
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whether the chance of a random match is low or high in the context of
DNA identifications. Experts can also provide context more generally
when giving evidence, where this is not restricted by legal rules.
In the case of jurors translating meaning into numbers, research on
meaningful anchors provides new insight into improving consistency. 162
Although jurors are prone to being influenced by meaningless anchor
amounts, this research has shown that they are more influenced by mean-
ingful anchors.' 63 Meaningful anchors are numbers that are relevant to
the case and to the decision regarding the award amount.1 64 Providing
these anchors for jurors is likely to increase consistency and decrease the
influence of irrelevant anchors on jurors.1 65 In the context of damage
award amounts and contributory negligence judgments, one way to pro-
vide meaningful anchors may be to provide jurors with scaling instruc-
tions that help to consistently map a numerical amount onto a gist based
judgment in an appropriate way.
The idea of using meaningful anchors to assist in judgment and de-
cision making has been shown to be effective in other areas using "risk
ladders."1 66 These ladders compare one risk with another risk in order to
increase risk understanding.1 6 7 For example, in risk ladders that commu-
nicate environmental risks, exposure levels to chemicals and associated
risk levels have been arrayed with low levels at the bottom and high
levels at the top, helping people to anchor a risk to upper-and lower-
bound reference points.
This work can be built on to develop "gist" scaling instructions that
do not just scale numbers, but focus the jury on the few major qualifica-
tions that matter (e.g. in a pain and suffering case, the intensity of pain
and suffering and the length of pain and suffering).1 68 This should allow
jurors to gain qualitative insights into the nature and magnitude of appro-
priate damages and avoid biasing influences, which should improve the
ability to allocate appropriate responsibility to a plaintiff or to award an
appropriate numerical damage award.
Damage award decisions and contributory negligence judgments re-
quire jurors to translate fuzzy qualitative concepts into numerical
amounts. As noted above, this leaves much ambiguity, even when jurors
162 Reyna et al., supra note 73, at 285-87.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 280.
165 Id. at 288.
166 Carmen Keller, Michael Siegrist & Vivianne Visschers, Effect of Risk Ladder Format
on Risk Perception in High-and Low-Numerate Individuals, 29 RISK ANALYSIS 1255, 1255
(2009).
167 Id.
168 DAVID BALL, DAVID BALL ON DAMAGES: A PLAINTIFF'S ATrORNEY's GUIDE FOR PER-
SONAL INJURY AND WRONGFUL DEATH CASES (2d ed. 2005).
TRIAL BY NUMBERS
agree on qualitative aspects of a case. A gist scale building on previous
work and focusing jurors on key meaning-based aspects of a case could
help jurors map their perceived severity of injury and deservingness of
damages onto a dollar scale, calibrating the severity of damage commen-
surately with an appropriate amount of money. In principle, scaling ap-
proaches can reduce irrelevant inconsistencies, such as larger damage
awards for similarly-injured plaintiffs who sue richer (compared to
poorer) defendants when actual damages are identical.
E. Active Jury Reforms
A final suggestion to help jurors understand and appropriately em-
ploy numerical information is to consider implementing active jury trial
reforms. Some years ago, B. Michael Dann, then a trial judge in Arizona
who regularly presided over jury trials, called for trial practice reforms
that took into account jurors' active decision-making approach.1 6 9 He ob-
served that traditional jury trials were conducted with the apparent as-
sumption that jurors were passive receptacles. In most jurisdictions even
today, jurors cannot ask questions, nor are they able to talk with one
another about the case until the final deliberations. 170 However, jury re-
search shows that jurors take an active approach from the start of the
trial, interpreting evidence and integrating it into a coherent narrative
story.' 7 ' What if they make errors in interpreting numerical information
early on? Withholding the opportunity to clarify evidence and issues by
forbidding juror questions or juror discussions during trial could be
counterproductive, considering the active approach that jurors take to
their decision making. 172
There is now a significant amount of research on the best practices
for lawyers and judges to implement active jury reforms, including ques-
tion asking and trial discussions. The American Judicature Society's rec-
ommendations offer clear directions and outline protections for the
169 B. Michael Dann, "Learning Lessons" and "Speaking Rights:" Creating Educated
and Democratic Juries, 68 IND. L.J. 1229, 1277-79 (1993).
170 GREGORY E. MIZE, PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR & NICOLE L. WATERS, THE STATE-OF-
THE-STATES SURVEY OF JURY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: A COMPENDIUM REPORT, 34-36 (2007)
(describing frequency of trial innovations in state and federal courts as reported in lawyer and
judge surveys); see also JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS (G. Thomas Munsterman, Paula L.
Hannford-Agor & G. Marc Whitehead eds., 2d ed. 2006) (identifying jury trial reforms and
positive and negative claims about them).
171 DENNIS J. DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING: THE STATE OF THE SCIENCE 26-28 (2012)
(explaining the story model of juror decision making).
172 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS, 17-19
(2005); Valerie P. Hans, U.S. Jury Reform: The Active Jury and the Adversarial Ideal, 21 ST.
Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 85, 90 (2002).
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parties.' 73 When such reforms are implemented, jurors are generally en-
thusiastic about the value and benefits of being allowed to ask questions
and being permitted to talk with other jurors during the trial under care-
fully specified circumstances. 174 Judges and lawyers tend to become
more favorable toward these trial reforms as well, once they have exper-
ienced them.17 5 We believe that trials with statistical evidence, cases that
we know can prove challenging to jurors, are especially likely to benefit
from the use of active trial reforms. Allowing juror questions during the
trial and permitting jurors to speak with one another during the presenta-
tion of evidence could help jurors gain relevant background knowledge
and appropriately critique statistical evidence. In addition, if jurors were
encouraged to use 2x2 tables to write down statistical evidence, this
could help avoid processing errors.
CONCLUSION
The Apple v. Samsung case may have been unusual in the amount of
public scrutiny that it received, but it represents only the tip of the ice-
berg when considering jurors' evaluations of numbers. Jurors are fre-
quently required to deal with numerical evidence, and to make judgments
with a numerical value. As noted above, these tasks are difficult, and
although jurors do a good job, they do often find these cases challenging.
In this Article, we have explored some common sources of error and
inconsistency in juror decision making, and have considered some of the
primary reasons that these errors occur. Table 5 summarizes some tech-
niques we have discussed that can be used to help jurors understand what
specific numbers mean and thus improve juror dealings with numbers.
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TRIAL BY NUMBERS
TABLE 5. SOURCES OF JUROR ERROR AND SUGGESTIONS To REDUCE
THESE SOURCES OF ERROR
Error Suggestions to reduce error
Interpretation of evidence can be Use column graphs or pie charts to
influenced by how information is framed convey magnitudes, to show the
equivalence of different values, and to
reduce biases based on how values are
framed.
Source probability error Use 2x2 tables, Venn Diagrams, stacked
column graphs, other visual aids, and
active jury reforms.
Prosecutor?s fallacy Use 2x2 tables, Venn Diagrams, stacked
column graphs, other visual aids, and
active jury reforms.
Difficulty combining two possible sources Use 2x2 tables, Venn Diagrams, stacked
of error column graphs, other visual aids, and
active jury reforms.
Difficulty critiquing evidence given by Provide statistical training for jurors,
experts attorneys, and judges; use expert
statisticians as a resource; use active jury
reforms.
Inconsistency and unpredictability of Use gist-based scales and scaling
jurors? numerical judgments instructions.
Biasing influences on jurors? numerical Use gist-based scales and scaling
judgments instructions.
Although juror numeracy may
all, especially as many errors are
help in some cases, it is not a cure-
likely to be caused by processing
problems rather than a lack of knowledge. In addition, selecting only
highly numerate jurors may actually introduce new systematic errors into
juror decisions. Psychological research suggests that what is really
important is understanding the meaning of numbers in context,
something that can be done well by individuals who do not have a high
level of technical numerical ability. This supports the role of the lay
jury, and suggests that clear presentation of numbers and interventions to
promote understanding of numbers and their meaning can help jurors
dealing with numbers and ensure community values are reflected in
judgments.
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